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1 Introduction
While regime switching modelling is a quite old and known tool in economics
and econometrics (see Hamilton, 1990, for a seminal presentation, and Zam-
polli, 2006, for a recent application to monetary policy), the economic and
mathematical literatures of optimal regime switching are probably much less
known. In the latter context, regime switching is a decision variable taken by
the economic agents or the whole economy on the basis of explicit or implicit
trade-offs, and not the result of random (Markovian or non-Markovian) pro-
cesses. Typically, regimes refer to institutional and/or technological states of
the world. For example, an economy starting with a given technology might
find it optimal to switch to a newly available technology or to stick to the old
one. Similarly, an economy initially in autarky might decide to switch to full
or partial financial liberalization letting international assets flow in and out.
More institutional examples can be easily picked: an economy initially out of
international agreements (like the Kyoto Protocol) might decide to join them
or remain out forever. In all cases, the corresponding switching decision is
shaped by the inherent nontrivial trade-offs under scrutiny. For example,
in the first technological example, the superiority of a newly available tech-
nology does not necessarily lead to immediate switching to this technology
(or immediate adoption) because of the associated obsolescence and learning
costs (see Parente, 1994, or Boucekkine et al., 2004). In the second and more
institutional example, switching to full financial liberalization is beneficial
because it brings more resources to the economy, but it also induces a clear
cost through the external debt burden (see Makris, 2001).
Since the mid 80s, a substantial optimal control literature has been de-
voted to handle the class of optimal switching problems described above.
This literature is mostly concerned with deterministic setting. We shall con-
sider the same framework in this paper.1 Tomiyama (1985) and Amit (1986)
are, to our knowledge, the earliest contributors to the related optimal control
literature. Interestingly enough, these two authors reformulate the optimal
switching problem as an optimal timing problem, therefore introducing the
time of switch as an explicit decision variable. Immediate switching and
sticking to the initial regime (or never switching) correspond to the corner
solutions of the problem in this setting. The authors have accordingly devel-
oped the maximum principle fitting the general optimal switching problems
considered, with a special attention to the geometric properties of the shadow
prices at the switching times (if any). Extensions of the maximum principle
1Optimal switching problems under uncertainty can be found in the literature, see for
example Pommeret and Schubert (2009).
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developed to any finite number of switching dates (corresponding to any finite
number of successive technological and/or institutional regimes) have been
already provided (see for example Saglam, 2011). Finally, dynamic games
settings encompassing optimal switching problems a` la Tomiyama have been
recently considered (see Boucekkine et al., 2011).
A common feature of all the problems studied in the literature outlined
above is that the technological and/or institutional regimes are exogenously
given. Precisely, these regimes are differentiated through a finite number
of discrete parameter values. For example, a newly available technological
regime may exhibit a higher productivity parameter but a larger abatement
cost parameter compared to the currently used technology. Switching or not
to the new technology and the related optimal timing strategy depend on the
induced efficiency/environmental friendliness tradeoff. In this paper, we en-
compass another type of regime switching problems related to the notion of
irreversibility. To fix the ideas, let us give an immediate example of what’s
meant by irreversibility and the corresponding optimal switching problem.
Consider the standard pollution problem where Nature absorbs part of the
pollution stock, giving rise to the so-called rate of natural decay of pollu-
tion. Irreversibility comes to the story here as follows: when the pollution
stock exceeds a certain threshold value, the natural decay rate goes down
permanently, that’s in an irreversible way. Accordingly, we get here another
regime switch, from reversible to irreversible pollution, a kind of ecologi-
cal transition governed by the law of motion of pollution and an associated
threshold value. This is in contrast to the optimal regime switching problems
a` la Tomiyama where the successive regimes are indexed by a finite number
of discrete parameter values and not by threshold values on state variables.
Optimal switching problems featuring irreversibility in the sense given just
above have been already studied by Tahvonen and Withagen (1996), and
more recently by Prieur et al. (2011). In particular, it is shown that sim-
ilarly to the optimal regime switching problems a` la Tomiyama, one can
formulate them as optimal timing problems, the date at which the threshold
value is reached (if any) being again an explicit control variable.
In this paper, we consider the general problem where both types of regime
switch co-exist. It is easy to understand why such problems are highly rele-
vant from the economic point of view. Consider the ecological problem with
irreversibility described above and allow the economy to also decide about
whether to switch to a newly available technology, cleaner but less produc-
tive than the pre-existing one. Clearly enough, the two switching problems,
the ecological and the technological optimal switching problems, will “inter-
act”. Indeed, the possibility to choose (at a certain optimal date) a cleaner
technology might decisively shape the decision to go or not for an ecological
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switch. To our knowledge, the unique paper considering this type of prob-
lems is Boucekkine et al. (2012). The authors show that the interaction of
two types of switching problems may generate a wide variety of relationships
between pollution and capital (as a proxy for output), mostly inconsistent
with the environmental Kuznets curve.
This paper goes much beyond the previous contribution and proposes
a general appraisal of optimal switching problems involving both types of
regimes: technological and/or institutional regimes indexed by a finite num-
ber of discrete parameter values, and ecological-like regimes which rely on
given threshold values for given state variables. We propose a general opti-
mal control framework allowing to derive the first-order optimality conditions
and in particular to characterize the geometry of the shadow prices at op-
timal switching times (if any). We do this using standard optimal control
techniques and we do obtain a clear-cut characterization of how the optimal
solutions look like in this sophisticated control framework.2
A second contribution of this paper is to apply this new optimal con-
trol material to address the problem of the optimal management of natural
resources under ecological irreversibility and the possibility to switch to a
backstop technology. For that purpose, we extend the classical exhaustible-
resource/stock-pollution model, studied by Tahvonen (1997), by introducing
the two types of regime switchings discussed so far. We first have irreversible
pollution as in Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) and Prieur (2009). The econ-
omy originally extracts and consumes a non-renewable resource, say fossil
fuels. Consumption causes emissions to be released and contributes to the
accumulation of a stock of pollutant. Beyond a critical pollutant concentra-
tion, the decay rate of pollution abruptly and permanently vanishes. This
ecological switch is triggered by a threshold level defined on the state variable.
The economy has also a backstop technology available. This technology can
supply a fixed share of the overall energy consumption at a constant unit cost.
Under perfect substitution, adopting the backstop allows for the replacement
of the polluting energy source with the clean renewable source, like solar or
wind power. In the same vein as Valente (2011), we model backstop adoption
as an optimal switching problem. This is a means to capture the second type
of regime switch linked to technological change. So, the economy has to de-
cide whether it switches to the backstop and when. Our work is therefore a
natural extension of Prieur et al. (2011) who study the optimal management
of exhaustible resources under irreversible pollution but do not deal with the
2An alternative would have been to use more complex techniques belonging to hybrid
control theory as in Shaikh and Caines (2007) commonly used in engineering. Given the
specificity of the general hybrid problems involved in economics (see next section), our
approach seems more natural and more accessible to the economists community.
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backstop technology adoption issue.
In this framework, there naturally exist multiple optimality candidates
that correspond to every possible combination of ecological and technolog-
ical regimes. Our first aim is to discuss the existence conditions of both
irreversible solutions (that’s, those characterized by the occurrence of an
ecological switch) and reversible solutions (those entailing a technological
switch). This analysis is conducted in the simplest case where the natural
resource is abundant. The next important question is whether the optimal
policy is reversible or not. This point is addressed is the case of a scarce
resource, notably by numerical solution of a calibrated version of the model.
For the sake of comparison, we take the plausible parameters values used by
Prieur et al. (2011). This allows us to stress the impact of technological
change on the nature of the optimal policy. Our analysis notably emphasizes
the role of the initial resource stock and of the unit cost of the backstop. The
main conclusion is that with the opportunity to adopt a backstop technology,
irreversible policies, that’s the policies leading to the irreversible ecological
regime, become more worthwhile in the sense that they do exist for lower
initial resource stocks compared to Prieur et al. (2011). It also appears that
when the cost of the backstop is low enough, irreversible policies yield the
optimal solution as soon as they exist. At first glance, this result seems to
be surprising but upon reflexion, it is very intuitive. For the optimal pol-
icy to be irreversible, the endowment in resource should be high enough so
that the economy is able to compensate (irreversible) pollution damages by
consuming a lot. Now, adopting the backstop after the crossing of the irre-
versibility threshold is a means to keep environmental damages under control
and explains why irreversible solutions are more likely.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general framework
that encompasses the class of economic problems featuring both technological
and/or institutional regimes and ecological-like regimes. Section 3 develops
the optimal control techniques suitable for dealing with these problems. Sec-
tion 4 is devoted to the application of the theory to the optimal management
of exhaustible resources under ecological irreversibility and backstop adop-
tion. Section 5 concludes.
2 The problem
We consider the following formal model with two types of state variables, x1
and x2; x1 and x2 could be in any space R
k
+, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. To simplify the
exposition, we set k = 1. Much more crucially, we shall distinguish between
the two state variables in a fundamental way: while the law of motion of
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x1 depends on the i-regime on which the economy lays, i = 1, ..., I, with
2 ≤ I < ∞, which is exogenously determined (that’s, independently of the
state and control variables of the problem), the law of motion of variable
x2 depends on the j-regime on which the economy lays, j = 1, ..., J , with
2 ≤ J < ∞, the j-regimes being determined by an increasing sequence of
threshold values, x¯j2, j = 0, ..., J − 1, with x¯02 = 0: the economy is in a j-
regime if x¯j−12 ≤ x2 < x¯j2, for j = 1, .., J − 1, and is in regime J if x2 ≥ x¯J−12 .
The control set U is defined as follows:
U = {um ∈ R, 1 ≤ m ≤M <∞}∪{t+1i ∈ R+, 1 ≤ i ≤ I−1}∪{t−1i ∈ R+, 2 ≤ i ≤ I}
∪{t+2j ∈ R+, 1 ≤ j ≤ J − 1} ∪ {t−2j ∈ R+, 2 ≤ j ≤ J}.
We distinguish between two types of control variables, the optimal timing
variables, tk1i and t
k
2j, k ∈ {+,−} and the non-timing variables, um. In
particular, t+1i, i = 1, ..., I−1, refers to the time at which the economy switches
from the i-regime i to the i-regime i+1. Similarly, t+2j, j = 1, ..., J−1, refers to
the time at which the economy switches from the j-regime j to the j-regime
j + 1. By definition of regimes j, we have: x2
(
t+2j
)
= x¯j2 , x2(t) ∈ [x¯j−12 , x¯j2]
in a neighborhood to the left of t+2j, and x2(t) ∈ [x¯j2, x¯j+12 ] in a neighborhood
to the right of t+2j . A priori, backward switchings are also possible: t
−
2i
(Resp. t−2j) denotes the time at which the economy switches from regime i
(Resp. j) to i− 1 (Resp. j − 1). Again by definition of regimes j, we have:
x2
(
t−2j
)
= x¯j−12 , x2(t) ∈ [x¯j−12 x¯j2] in a neighborhood to the right of t−2j, and
x2(t) ∈ [x¯j−22 x¯j−12 ] in a neighborhood to the left of t−2j . Some comments
are in order here. First of all, our framework encompasses either irreversible
or reversible regime changes. Problems with irreversible choices result in
smaller control sets since in these cases the timing variables t−1i and t
−
2j are
irrelevant. In our Section 4, we examine the irreversible case: a problem with
irreversible pollution and with technology adoption in which switching back
is not allowed.
Second, by definition of the j-regimes, there is no option for the economy
to jump directly from regime j to regime j + 2, j ∈ {1, ..., J − 2}, because
this implies a discrete jump in the state variable x2; we shall assume as in the
standard optimal control theory case that all the optimal trajectories of the
state variables should be continuous and piecewise differentiable. In contrast,
jumping from regime i to i+2, i = {1, ..., I−2} is possibly optimal since it is
not related to a jump in a state variable. In the example considered in Section
4, regime i is linked to the realization of a given vector of exogenous variables,
say Z ∈ Rn, n ≥ 1, taking I discrete values {Z1, Z2, ..., ZI}: the economy is in
regime i if Z = Zi, which happens by definition if t ∈ [t+1i−1, t+1i[. Therefore,
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it is possible for the economy to optimally jump from regime i, given by Zi,
to regime i + 2 given by Zi+2. In such a case, one gets the corner solution:
t+1i = t
+
1,i+1. Third, a fundamental property of the problem is that while the
timing variables t+2j, j = 1, ..., J − 1, are ordered by construction, and that
the timing variables t+1i, i = 1, ..., I − 1, could be also naturally ordered once
the underlying sequence of exogenous realizations {Z1, Z2, ..., ZI} is ordered,
there is no natural ordering at all between the two sets of timing variables,
t+2j and t
+
1i: a switch through x1 may precede, coincide or follow a switch
through x2. This is the main complication of our setting. It goes without
saying that allowing for reversibility complicates massively the analysis. In
the following, we will assume irreversibility, the control set is then reduced
to:
U ′ = {um ∈ R, 1 ≤ m ≤M <∞}∪{t+1i ∈ R+, 1 ≤ i ≤ I−1}∪{t+2j ∈ R+, 1 ≤ j ≤ J−1},
which can be written without any risk of confusion under irreversibility as:
U ′ = {um ∈ R, 1 ≤ m ≤M <∞}∪{t1i ∈ R+, 1 ≤ i ≤ I−1}∪{t2j ∈ R+, 1 ≤ j ≤ J−1}.
State equations
We now specify precisely the general optimal control problem under study.
We start with the law of motions of the state variables. Naturally enough,
the laws of motion for x1 and x2 depend on which state the economy is laying.
By construction, the state of the economy is determined here by the couples
(i, j), i = 1, ..., I and j = 1, ..., J , describing on which regime x1 and x2
respectively are laying. We shall introduce the following definitions to ease
the exposition.
Definition 2.1 • The economy is said in state (i, j) if x1 is in regime
i, i = 1, ..., I, and x2 is in regime j, i = 1, ..., J .
• We say that the economy i-switches (Resp. j-switches) at time t ≥ 0
if and only if t = t1i (Resp. t = t2j).
Because the dynamics of x1 and x2 are generally inter-dependent, the
general laws of motion, and concretely the state functions, should account
for the realization of both the i-regimes and j-regimes. Suppose the economy
is in state (i, j) on a given time interval (with nonzero measure), then the
law of motions of both variables will be written as follows:
x˙1 = G
ij
1 (u1, ..., uM , x1, x2;Zi)
and
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x˙2 = G
ij
2 (u1, ..., uM , x1, x2;Zi) .
Functions Gijk , i = 1, ..., I, j = 1, ..., J and k = 1, 2 are some given smooth
functions, we shall be more precise about smoothness later. For example
in the minimal case where I = J = 2, 4 state functions are to be specified
to describe the 4 states on which the economy can lay depending on the
occurrence of i-regimes and j-regimes. Importantly enough, we shall make
the following assumption on the economy’s initial position.
Hypothesis 2.1 The economy is initially in state (1, 1), that it is initially
Z(0) = Z1 and x2(0) ∈ [0 x¯12[.
Also from now on, we will remove Zi from the list of inputs of functions
Gijk as the upper-index i of these functions is enough to reflect the dependence
of these functions on i. More important, it is crucial to note that not all the
states are necessarily optimal. For example switching the i-regimes may not
be optimal while switching the j-regimes may be so. In such a case, only the
states (1, j), j = 1, ..., J , may be optimal. We shall be more precise about
optimality hereafter.
Optimality
We postulate that the objective function to be maximized in the control
set U ′ takes the form:
V (x10, x
2
0) =
∞∫
0
F (u1, ..., uM , x1, x2) e
−δtdt,
where x10 = x1(0) and x
2
0 = x2(0), and F (.) is another smooth function.
The exact statement of the state equations depends on the ordering of the
possible i-switches timings with respect to those of the possible j-switches.
In other terms, the state equations depend on how the controls t1i situate,
compared to the controls t2j. No ordering can be a priori excluded. If
all the timing variables are strictly ordered, then the time support, R+ is
divided in I + J − 1 time sub-intervals. This is the maximal number of
sub-intervals to be considered, the lower bound being 1, namely when no
i-switch nor j-switch is undertaken (that’s the starting state (1, 1) is optimal
for all t). The technique developed to solve the problem relies on a recur-
sive scheme on the successive sub-problems induced by the restriction of the
problem to these sub-intervals. This technique has been first put forward by
Tomiyama (1985) and Amit (1986), and more recently applied to economics
by Boucekkine et al. (2004). In all the latter papers, only i-switches are
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considered. Boucekkine et al. (2012) is the first application to problems
involving both i-switches and j-switches. As mentioned in the introduction,
these authors consider a specific linear-quadratic environmental problem with
one possible technological switching and one possible ecological switching. A
variant of it is re-examined in the examples section. This paper generalizes
their approach.
Before developing more in detail this approach, some technical assump-
tions are needed.
Hypothesis 2.2 • Functions F (.) and Gijk , i, j, k are smooth and are
all assumed to be of class C1.
• When the economy is in state (i, j), the optimal control sub-problem,
restriction of the optimal control problem to state (i, j) for given tim-
ing variables, that is with restricted control set U ′′ = {u1, u2, ..., uM},
verifies the Arrow-Kurz sufficiency conditions.
The assumption will not only ensure that the optimal control problems
and sub-problems encountered along the way are well-behaved, it also allows
to use safely some envelope properties requiring the differentiability of the
value-function. In particular, the second part of the hypothesis ensures the
latter property: if Arrow-Kurz conditions are met, the optimal control prob-
lems and sub-problems to be handled are concave enough for the involved
value-functions to be differentiable (see Theorem 9, page 213, in Seierstad
and Sydsaeter, 1987). The definition of the sub-problems in the statement
of Hypothesis (2.2) will be clear when the multi-stage optimal control used
will be detailed in the next section.
Finally, as mentioned above, we do not depart from the traditional func-
tional spaces in control theory: we keep on seeking for solutions where the
control u(t) in piecewise continuous on R+ and the state variables, xi(t),
i = 1, 2, are continuous, piecewise differentiable on R+.
3 Theory
To ease the exposition, we shall start with the detailed analysis of the minimal
case I = J = 2, which can be considered as the first generalization of the
work of Boucekkine et al. (2012).
3.1 The case I = J = 2
We consider to this end the following formal model with two states, x1 and
x2, and three controls u = u1, t1 = t11 and t2 = t21. In particular, we have
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x2(t2) = x¯
1
2 = x¯2, where x¯2 is the threshold value of state variable x2. We set
M = 1 for simplicity. As mentioned above, the exact statement of the state
equations depends on the position of t1 with respect to t2. We shall write the
first-order conditions corresponding to all possible orderings, including the
special case t1 = t2. We also consider the possibility to have either immediate
i-switch or no switch at all in last place.
3.1.1 The case t1 < t2
In this case, we have the following laws of motion:
x˙1 =

G111 (u, x1, x2) if 0 ≤ t < t1
G211 (u, x1, x2) if t1 ≤ t < t2
G221 (u, x1, x2) if t ≥ t2
and
x˙2 =

G112 (u, x1, x2) if 0 ≤ t < t1
G212 (u, x1, x2) if t1 ≤ t < t2
G222 (u, x1, x2) if t ≥ t2
with both x1(0) = x
1
0 and x2(0) = x
2
0 given. The objective function to be
maximized with respect to u, t1 and t2, is:
V (x10, x
2
0) =
∞∫
0
F (u, x1, x2) e
−δtdt.
As in Boucekkine et al. (2004) or Tahvonen and Withagen (1996), a
natural approach is to decompose the problem into several sub-problems for
given timing variables, to solve each of them (which is usually very simple
although not always analytically conclusive), and then to identify the optimal
timings. With one timing variable, two sub-problems are involved. In our
case, three would result from the decomposition. Indeed since:
V (x10, x
2
0) =
t1∫
0
F (u, x1, x2) e
−δtdt+
t2∫
t1
F (u, x1, x2) e
−δtdt+
∞∫
t2
F (u, x1, x2) e
−δtdt,
under t1 < t2, one can view the problem sequentially, starting with the regime
arising at the last switch, in the spirit of Tomiyama (1985). Precisely, one
has to follow the following recursive scheme in our case:
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• Third interval sub-problem: the problem in this regime is:
max
{u}
V3 =
∞∫
t2
[F (u, x1, x2)] e
−δtdt
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
22
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
22
2 (u, x1, x2)
where t2 and the initial conditions x1(t2) = x
1
2 and x2(t2) = x¯2 are
fixed. The associated hamiltonian is:
H3 = F e
−δt + λ221 G
22
1 + λ
22
2 G
22
2 ,
where λijk is the co-state variable associated with the state variable k
when the economy is in state (i, j). The resulting value-function is of
the form V ∗3 (t2, x
1
2).
• Second interval sub-problem: in the next interval, the maximization
problem is:
max
{u,t2,x12}
V2 =
t2∫
t1
F (u, x1, x2)e
−δtdt+ V ∗3 (t2, x
1
2)
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
21
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
21
2 (u, x1, x2)
,
where t1, x1(t1) = x
1
1 and x2(t1) = x
2
1 are given, and t2 and x1(t2) = x
1
2
are free. The corresponding hamiltonian is
H2 = F e
−δt + λ211 G
21
1 + λ
21
2 G
21
2 ,
and the value-function obtained is of the form V ∗2 (t1, x
1
1, x
2
1).
• First interval sub-problem: This sub-problem considers the interval
[0 t1] :
max
{u,t1,x11,x21}
V1 = V =
t1∫
0
F (u, x1, x2)e
−δtdt+ V ∗2 (t1, x
1
1, x
2
1)
11
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
11
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
11
2 (u, x1, x2)
,
with x1(0) and x2(0) given, and with free t1, x
1
1, and x
2
1. H1, the
hamiltonian of the the sub-problem, is given by:
H1 = F e
−δt + λ111 G
11
1 + λ
11
2 G
11
2 ,
and it is obvious that V ∗1 = V
∗.
The recursive scheme above works exactly as a dynamic programming
device as first noticed by Tomiyama (1985): one would use exactly the same
scheme to handle a dynamic optimization problem in discrete time over three
periods. Here the Bellman principle applies on the three intervals involved
by the double timing problem instead of discrete periods of time. Also notice
that given our smoothness and concavity assumptions, each optimal control
sub-problem is well-behaved, we will not spend space on writing the cor-
responding standard Pontryagin conditions. Rather, we will focus on two
aspects: uncovering the optimality conditions with respect to the timing
variables and the so-called matching conditions.3 Matching conditions refer
to how the hamiltonians, Hn, n = 1, ..., I + J − 1 = 3, and the co-state
variables λkij, i, j, k = 1, 2, behave at the optimal junction times, here t
∗
1 and
t∗2. This is solved by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Under Hypothesis (2.2), one gets at the optimal junction
times t∗1 and t
∗
2:
H∗2 (t
∗
2) = H
∗
3 (t
∗
2), (1)
λ22∗1 (t
∗
2) = λ
21∗
1 (t
∗
2), (2)
H∗1 (t
∗
1) = H
∗
2 (t
∗
1), (3)
λ21∗1 (t
∗
1) = λ
11∗
1 (t
∗
1), (4)
and
λ21∗2 (t
∗
1) = λ
11∗
2 (t
∗
1). (5)
3As we will see later one, there is a non-empty intersection between these two types of
conditions
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A detailed proof is in the Appendix. A few comments are in order here.
First of all, one can read the 5 optimality conditions above as continuity or
matching conditions at the junction points. In this respect, conditions (1)
and (3) impose the continuity of the hamiltonian at the optimal junction
times while the other conditions ensure the continuity of co-state variables
at these times. Interestingly enough, one can observe that while at the i-
switching time, both co-state variables are optimally continuous, only the
one associated with x1 is necessarily continuous at the j-switching time.
This points at the major difference between the two switching types: in the
latter, the state variable (here x2) is fixed at the j-switching time, equal to
the threshold value, while at the i-switching time, both state variables can be
freely chosen. This generally implies discontinuity of the co-state variables
associated with the state variables of the x2 type at j-switching times in
contrast to i-switching times.
Second, one can interpret the matching conditions (1)-(3) as first-order
optimal timing conditions for t2 and t1 respectively. Generally speaking, the
matching condition for timing tn may be therefore written as:
H∗n(tn)−H∗n+1(tn) = 0,
for n = 1, ..., I + J − 2. This condition is quite common in the literature
of multi-stage technological switching (see Saglam, 2011, for example), de-
scribed here by switches of type i. Importantly enough, we show here that
it applies also to switches of type j (here, at the switching time t2). The ex-
plicit mathematical proof that the conditions above are indeed the first-order
optimality conditions for interior ti’s maximizers is given in the Appendix us-
ing standard envelope properties on the successive sub-problems’ value func-
tions. Keeping the discussion non-technical, one may simply interpret the
difference H∗n(tn) − H∗n+1(tn), n = 1, ..., I + J − 2, following Makris (2001),
as the marginal gain from extending the regime inherent to the time interval
[tn−1, tn], with t0 = 0, at the expense of the regime associated with interval
[tn, tn+1]. Because there are no direct switching costs (unlike in the original
works on multi-stage optimal control, more operation-research oriented as
in Amit, 1986), the marginal switching cost is nil. Therefore, the matching
conditions with respect to hamiltonians at the optimal switching times do
equalize marginal benefits and costs of delaying the switching times. Hence
they do feature first-order necessary conditions with respect to the latters.
We consider now briefly two remaining cases of interest with two interior
switchings. As we we will see, they derive quite trivially from the analysis of
the benchmark case.
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3.1.2 Other orderings of timings
If j-switching precedes i-switching, that is if 0 < t2 < t1 < ∞, then The-
orem 1 can be easily reformulated using the same techniques exposed in
the Appendix, after decomposition of the optimal control problem into the
corresponding three sub-problems and proper definition of the associated
hamiltonians and co-sate variables. Precisely, one gets the following optimal
timing and matching conditions:
Proposition 3.1 Under Hypothesis (2.2), one gets at the optimal junction
times t∗1 and t
∗
2:
H∗1 (t
∗
2) = H
∗
2 (t
∗
2), (6)
λ11∗1 (t
∗
2) = λ
12∗
1 (t
∗
2), (7)
H∗2 (t
∗
1) = H
∗
3 (t
∗
1), (8)
λ12∗1 (t
∗
1) = λ
22∗
1 (t
∗
1), (9)
and
λ12∗2 (t
∗
1) = λ
22∗
2 (t
∗
1). (10)
Again the hamiltonians are continuous at the optimal junction times while
the co-state variable associated to x1 is also continuous at all optimal switch-
ing times, and the co-state variable associated to x2 is only continuous at the
i-switching time.
The last two (interior) switching cases follow the same logic though the
list of corresponding first-order timing and matching conditions is shorter
because only two successive regimes are optimal, not three: one before t1 =
t2 = t
s and one after the simultaneous i-switch and j-switch. Similarly to
the previous section, denote by H1 and H2 the hamiltonians corresponding to
the sub-problems on the intervals [0, ts] and [ts, ∞) respectively. Precisely,
denoting the hamiltonians by:
H1 = F e
−δt + λ111 G
11
1 + λ
11
2 G
11
2 ,
and
H2 = F e
−δt + λ221 G
22
1 + λ
22
2 G
22
2 ,
one gets the following proposition, which can be seen as the counterpart of
Theorem (3.1).
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Proposition 3.2 Under Hypothesis (2.2), one gets at the optimal junction
time ts = t1 = t2:
H∗1 (t
s) = H∗2 (t
s), (11)
and
λ11∗1 (t
s) = λ22∗1 (t
s). (12)
The proof follows exactly the same technique used to demonstrate The-
orem (3.1), we skip it to save space. Naturally enough, we obtain the same
qualitative results as in the previous case with distinct switching times: the
hamiltonians are continuous at the optimal junction time, the co-state vari-
able of x1 is also continuous at that time in contrast to the co-state variable
associated to x2 which may jump. Hence despite we assume that the i-switch
and j-switch coincide, the difference between the two co-state variables re-
main. Again, this is simply due to the fact that at t = ts, the state variable
x2 is fixed, equal to the threshold value posited (that is x2(t
s) = x¯2) while
the state variable x1 is free at that time.
3.1.3 Corner solutions
We now briefly discuss the existence of corner solutions. In the case I =
J = 2, four corner solutions are possible: (i) no i-switch: t1 = ∞; (ii) no
j-switch: t2 =∞; (iii) immediate i-switch: t1 = 0 ; (iv) immediate j-switch:
t2 = 0. The cases where there is a simultaneous and immediate i and j switch
or no switch at all in both regimes are special corner situations covered
by the latter categorization. Corner regimes are important and should be
accounted for rigorously. They are considered in all the papers in multi-stage
optimal control either for i-switching type (see Tomiayama, 1985, or more
recently Saglam, 2011) or for j-switching type (see in particular, Tahvonen
and Withagen, 1996).
Corner solutions can be handled in two ways. One way is to solve for the
optimal control problems induced by the corner solutions in order to deter-
mine the associated value-function and to compare it with the one(s) implied
by the alternative interior solution(s). If this strategy is followed, there is
no need to derive necessary conditions for the occurrence of corner solutions.
A more analytical approach would, in contrast, attempt to establishing this
set of conditions. It is quite trivial to identify these conditions. For exam-
ple, suppose we seek for necessary conditions for the corner case t∗1 = 0 and
t∗2 > 0. From Section 3.1.1, we know that interior optimal timings are given
by the condition
H∗n(tn)−H∗n+1(tn) = 0,
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for i = 1, ..., I + J − 2, which amounts to equalize marginal benefits and
costs of delaying the switching times. The same type of arguments could be
used to visualize easily the kind of necessary conditions inherent to corner
switching times: in our working example, t∗1 = 0 implies H
∗
1 (0)−H∗2 (0) ≤ 0
while t∗2 > 0 implies H
∗
2 (t
∗
2) − H∗3 (t∗2) = 0.4 The former inequality simply
means that the marginal benefits from delaying immediate i-switching are
equal to or lower than its costs.
Symmetrically, it is also straightforward to identify necessary conditions
for the never-switching case. Consistently with the timing t1 < t2 of Section
3.1.1, let us do the job for the corner case t∗1 > 0 and t
∗
2 =∞. The necessary
conditions should be:
H∗1 (t1)−H∗2 (t1) = 0,
and
lim
t2→+∞
H∗2 (t2)−H∗3 (t2) ≥ 0.
Again the interpretation is simple: the economy would never j-switch if
the marginal benefits of delaying such a switch are asymptotically equal to
or larger than its costs.5 While the corner conditions exhibited here above
are rather elementary, they are not likely to be decisive in practice, not
only because they are only necessary conditions, but also because they may
not yield a clear-cut analytical characterization (of the corner solution) if
the problems are highly non-linear. Interestingly enough, Boucekkine et al.
(2004, 2011) find them useful in models with linear production functions
and log-linear or linear utility functions. Outside this class of problems, the
analytical usefulness of these conditions may be questioned, and the first
approach, more computational, explained at the beginning of this section,
may be largely preferred.
3.2 The general case
We now consider the general case with any finite numbers of i and j-regimes
(2 ≤ I, J <∞). The working introductory case I = J = 2 has been detailed
enough to catch the main intuitions behind the optimality conditions (as
stated in Theorem 1) and to extract the relevant methodological conclusions.
4Needless to say, in this case H∗2 (t
∗
2)−H∗3 (t∗2) = 0 has to be solved for t∗2 with t∗1 fixed
to 0.
5The proof is slightly less trivial that in the symmetrical corner case with immediate
switching as it requires the application of the envelope theorem. This is ensured here
under Hypothesis (2.2). See also Tahvonen and Withagen, 1996, for an earlier analysis of
such a case.
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While the exact optimal timing and matching conditions strongly depend on
the ordering between the i-switching times t1i and the j-switching times t2j,
the following necessary conditions always apply in the case of interior optimal
switching times, independently of the latter ordering.
Proposition 3.3 Suppose Hypothesis (2.2) holds. Also suppose 0 < t11 <
... < t1,I−1 <∞ and 0 < t21 < ... < t2,J−1 <∞ are optimal then.
• for any switching time, tn, n = 1, ..., I + J − 2, whatever the switching
type, we have:
H∗n(tn)−H∗n+1(tn) = 0,
where Hn (Resp. Hn+1) is the hamiltonian of the optimal control sub-
problem, restricted to the state where the economy is laying before
(Resp. after) the switching time tn.
• For any switching time, tn, n = 1, ..., I + J − 2, whatever the switching
type, we have:
λij1 (tn) = λ
i′j′
1 (tn),
provided economy switches from state (i, j) to state (i′, j′) at tn, λ
ij
1
(Resp. λi
′j′
1 ) is x1’s co-state variable when the economy is in state (i, j)
(Resp. (i′, j′)).
• For any switching time, t1i, i = 1, ..., I − 1, we have:
λij2 (t1i) = λ
i′,j
2 (t1i),
with, λij2 the co-state variable associated with x2 when the economy is
in state (i, j).
Proposition (3.3) is a kind of summarized wisdom of the lessons extracted
from the detailed analysis of case I = J = 2. The proof can simply be done
by elementary adaptation of the proof of Theorem 1. The first conditions on
hamiltonians at switching times (whatever the type of switching) generalize
conditions (1) and (3) in Theorem 1. The second conditions on continuity of
the co-state variables of variable x1 at the switching times, again whatever
the switching type, are a generalization of conditions (2) and (4) of Theorem
1. Finally the third conditions on the continuity of the co-state variables
associated with variable x2 at the switching times of i-type only are a broader
view of condition (5) of Theorem 1.
We now move to the application.
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4 Technological switching under irreversible
pollution
In this section, we revisit the classical problem in resource economics of the
optimal management of non-renewable resources. As an application to the
theory developed in the preceding section, we will analyze this problem when
the economy is submitted to the potential irreversibility of pollution and has
a backstop technology available.
The basic model is extensively based on a recent study by Prieur et al.
(2011) who look at the features of the optimal extraction/emission policy
under irreversibility and exhaustibility. So, Prieur et al. (2011) already deal
with the second type of switch discussed so far that is, the one related to
a threshold effect. Here we extend their analysis with the introduction of a
technological switch, which will be related to the adoption of the backstop
technology. To be more precise, things work as follows.
The economy extracts and consumes an exhaustible resource, say fossil
fuels, x at rate e = 0. The initial resource stock x0 is given. Extraction
is costless but is responsible for GHG emissions, with a one-to-one relation-
ship. The economy has also a backstop technology available that can satisfy
a given amount s = 0 of the total energy consumption, y. The kind of back-
stop technology we have in mind includes the renewable and non-polluting
energy sources such as the solar energy and the wind power. The backstop
is produced at a fixed unit cost c > 0.
Utility is defined over the consumption of fossil fuels and the backstop,
U(y), with y = e + s. In the same vein as Tahvonen and Withagen (1996)
and Tahvonen (1997) we make:6
Hypothesis 4.1 The utility function is such that: U(0) = 0, U ′′(.) < 0,
0 < U ′(0) <∞ and there exists y¯ such that U ′(y¯) = 0.
Rewriting the rate of extraction as e = y − s, the law of motion of the
stock of non renewable resource is:
x˙ = −(y − s) with x(0) = x0 given, (13)
Emissions contribute to the accumulation of a pollution stock, z. The
initial pollution stock is given: z0. As in Prieur et al. (2011), we assume
6Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) are the first to provide a rigorous analysis of the impact
of irreversibility on the optimal control of pollution. They use a quadratic decay function
but do not consider neither resource scarcity nor the backstop technology. Tahvonen
(1997) examines in detail the classical exhaustible-resource/stock-pollution model, with a
backstop technology but without irreversible pollution.
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that pollution would turn irreversible if the stock passes a critical threshold
z¯, with z¯ > z0. This irreversibility threshold corresponds to the first possible
regime switch that affects the law of motion of the pollution stock. Hence,
the dynamics of the stock of the pollutant are defined piece-wise:
z˙ =
{
y − s− αz if z ≤ z¯
y − s else (14)
The natural decay rate α is constant and positive as long as accumulated
emissions are not too high, that is, as long as the stock remains below or is
at the irreversibility threshold z¯. Once the threshold is surpassed, natural
decay abruptly vanishes. Thus, pollution becomes irreversible. Hereafter,
the domain where z ≤ z¯ is called the reversible region whereas whenever
pollution is higher than z¯, the economy is said to be in the irreversible region.
Let 0 5 tz 5∞ be the instant when the irreversible region is entered.
Pollution is damaging to the economy. For any level z, pollution damage
is denoted by D(z).
Hypothesis 4.2 The damage function is such that: D(0) = 0, D′(z) > 0,
D′′(z) > 0 for all z > 0, D′(0) = 0 and limz→∞D′(z) =∞.
The social welfare function thus reads
V =
∞∫
0
[U(y)−D(z)− cs] e−δtdt, (15)
with δ the discount rate.
The second possible regime switch is related to the adoption of the back-
stop technology. Hereafter, we will assume that the economy initially does
not use the backstop, which is in the line of the related literature (see for
instance Tahvonen, 1997). However, we depart from this literature in the
following sense. In our framework, s is not a control variable. This means
that once the economy finds it worthwhile to use the backstop, it cannot
choose the exact amount to provide. Rather we consider that the provision
of energy by the backstop is fixed. So, in the same vein as Valente (2011), we
treat the issue of the backstop adoption as an optimal timing problem (see
also for related problems Boucekkine et al., 2004, 2011, 2012) and the control
variable is the instant 0 5 ts 5∞ when the backstop is introduced and used
at a given intensity. This is consistent with the kind of technological change
studied in the section devoted to the theory. This is of course a simplifying
assumption but it allows us to convey the idea that the energy consumption
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from the backstop is limited by nature. Here, our s can be seen as the max-
imum share of energy consumption that can be provided by solar and wind
equipments, due to technical constraints. For instance, Europe has engaged
in provisioning 20 % of the total energy consumption thanks to renewables
at the horizon 2020. In our framework, given that the maximum of energy
consumption from all sources is y¯, this boils down to defining s as a share of
y¯.
Remark. The resource stock corresponds to the first type of state vari-
able considered in the theoretical section, that is the one whose law of motion
is influenced only by the technological regime, whereas pollution is the second
type of state variable whose evolution is determined by both the technologi-
cal and the ecological regime. Also note that the two possible switchings are
irreversible.
Let us start the analysis with the case where the economy does not face
resource scarcity, that is x0 =∞.
4.1 The case of an abundant resource
In this section, we don’t pay attention to the dynamics of the resource (13),
which boils down to considering that x0 = ∞ or put differently, that the
co-state of the resource, often called the scarcity rent, is generically equal to
zero. We further assume that the economy originally is in the regime with no
use of the backstop and with reversible pollution (indexed by 11). But any
optimality candidate, that is any solution to the necessary optimality condi-
tions, can experience four different regimes: the initial one, a regime without
backstop and with irreversible pollution (12), with a backstop and reversible
pollution (21) and finally with the backstop and irreversible pollution (22).
Let us state the set of necessary optimality conditions in the most general
regime 21. Consider the problem of maximizing social welfare with respect
to {y} given z˙ = y − s − αz, over any non-degenerate period of time. The
hamiltonian in current value is H = U(y) − D(z) − λ(y − s − αz), with λ
the co-state variable of z. For an interior solution, y > 0, the necessary
optimality conditions include:
U ′(y) = λ
λ˙ = (α + δ)λ−D′(z)
z˙ = y − s− αz
(16)
The corresponding conditions for regime 11 are obtained by putting s equal
to zero whereas those of irreversible regimes can be derived by setting α = 0
with s > 0 (22) or s = 0 (12).
20
We also have the necessary conditions of Theorem 3.1, related to the two
kinds of timing decisions. First consider a switch to the backstop technology
in any ecological regime at instant ts. From what has been established before,
both the state variable and its co-state must be continuous at ts. From (16),
this implies that y1j(ts) = y2j(ts) = yj(ts) for j = 1, 2. Energy consumption
is continuous at the switching time but of course the part originating from
fossil fuels jumps downward with the adoption of the backstop: e2j(ts) =
e1j(ts) − s < e1j(ts). Making use of the continuity of consumption, the
continuity of the Hamiltonian in turn yields the following condition:
U ′(yj(ts)) = c. (17)
The economy adopts the backstop technology when the marginal gain of
doing so is equal to the marginal cost. At first glance, this condition does not
seem to be directly affected by the proximity of the irreversibility threshold.
But of course, the evolution of energy consumption, the value yj(ts) and the
switching time will ultimately depend on the pollution level, which is itself
based on the particular ecological regime.
As for the ecological switch, we know that the co-state is not continuous
is general since the pollution stock that triggers the switch is given and equal
to z¯. The Hamiltonian is still continuous at date tz, this leads to the following
optimality condition:7
U(y21(tz))−U ′(y21(tz))(y21(tz)−s−αz¯) = U(y22(tz))−U ′(y22(tz))(y22(tz)−s).
(18)
Under hypothesis 4.1, the function U(y) − U ′(y)(y − s) is monotonically
increasing in y (recall that by definition s 5 y). This implies that the
entrance in the irreversible region is accompanied by an upward discontinuity
in y – and e – as already noticed by Prieur et al. (2011). The economy
compensates for the loss of benefits (from pollution decay) by an increase in
energy consumption.
It is also possible that the two switches occur simultaneously ts = tz = t1
in which case the necessary condition reads:
U(y11(t1))−U ′(y11(t1))(y11(t1)−αz¯) = U(y22(t1))−U ′(y22(t1))(y22(t1)−s)−cs,
(19)
and it is not clear whether the consumption of fossil fuels falls or rises as a
consequence of the occurrence of the double switch. Indeed, the two under-
lined mechanisms push in opposite direction. On the one hand, entering the
7The condition is written in the case where the ecological switch occurs once the back-
stop has been adopted. The corresponding condition, for a regime switch in the absence
of backstop, is the same, with s = 0.
21
irreversible region is an incentive for the economy to increase the consump-
tion of energy – and of fossil fuels given s (irreversibility effect). On the other,
adopting the backstop allows the economy to substitute part of the consump-
tion of fossil fuels with the consumption brought by the backstop (backstop
effect). Overall energy consumption increases because if the technological
switch has not occurred up to date t1, one necessarily has U
′(y22(t1)) ≤ c.
Following Prieur et al. (2011)’s approach, we can define a set of conditions
under which we have an interesting problem in the sense that it allows for
multiple solutions with different features. In particular, a solution is said to
be reversible when it remains in the reversible region whereas it is irreversible
when the irreversibility threshold is exceeded in finite time. To start with,
ignore the issue of irreversibility and assume that regime 21 is terminal then
the resulting dynamics
y˙ = 1
U ′′(y)((α + δ)U
′(y)−D′(z))
z˙ = y − s− αz (20)
lead the economy to a saddle point (y21∞, z
21
∞) uniquely defined by
U ′(αz21∞ + s) =
D′(z21∞)
α + δ
and y21∞ = s+ αz
21
∞ .
In addition, it is obvious that the fixed point associated with the initial
regime (y11∞, z
11
∞) is such that y
11
∞ < y
21
∞ and z
11
∞ > z
21
∞ . This implies that
adopting the backstop at some point in time allows the economy to reach a
steady state with lower pollution, high energy consumption but lower fossil
fuels consumption.
Some straightforward conclusions can be drawn from the comparison be-
tween z¯, z11∞ and z
21
∞ . If the pollution threshold is high enough z¯ = z¯h > z
11
∞
then the solution will necessarily be reversible, including or not a switch to
the backstop technology (see the phase diagram depicting the dynamics of
regimes 11 and 12 in Figure 1). Originating in the reversible region and
in regime 11 (the most favorable for the occurrence of the ecological switch
since the economy relies on polluting resources), it is clear that the dynam-
ics, represented by the arrows, cannot drive the economy to a level y11(tz)
that would allow for the upward jump to y12(tz). By contrast, with a low
threshold, reversible and irreversible solutions are both feasible but reversible
policies will necessarily feature a final stage at the threshold. Suppose that
the economy is in regime 21. Then, when z¯ = z¯l < z
21
∞ the steady states
above cannot be achieved and the only possible reversible policy is the solu-
tion where the pure state constraint z ≤ z¯ is binding for a non degenerate
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z¯h
y˙11 = 0
y˙12 = 0z˙11 = 0
z˙12 = 0
0 z0
y0
y12(tz)
z11∞
Figure 1: High irreversibility threshold and reversible solutions.
period of time. (see the phase diagram given by Figure 2).8 In the remainder
of the analysis, we will focus on the most interesting case where adopting the
backstop may be a means to avoid the situation when the pollution turns
irreversible. This translates into the following ordering: z21∞ < z¯ < z
11
∞ , which
is equivalent to:
U ′−1
(
D′(z¯)
α + δ
)
− s < αz¯ < U ′−1
(
D′(z¯)
α + δ
)
. (21)
and one may note that the second part of the inequality implies that y¯ >
αz¯ the maximum rate of energy and fossil fuels consumption that is the
maximum rate of emissions allowed is higher than the maximum rate of decay.
This is also necessary for the existence of irreversible optimality candidates.
In this case there are two options available to the economy. Either it
adopts the backstop technology before the threshold is hit, which produces
8Prieur et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive study of solutions featuring a stage at
the threshold. Here, we do not have to bother with this kind of solution since in our model
there exists an alternative reversible solution that consists in adopting the backstop before
the threshold is reached. That’s why we do not consider the pure state constraint.
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Figure 2: Low irreversibility threshold and irreversible solutions.
a reversible policy. This corresponds to the timing 0 < ts < tz = ∞ with
the sequence of regimes 11 and 21. Or it enters the irreversible region before
the technological switch. This may be observed when the optimal timing is
0 < tz < ts 5 ∞ with sequence 11 then 12 and possibly 22 as a terminal
regime.
A last necessary condition is required in order for irreversible solutions to
exist. Consider the combination of regime 11 and 12. Suppose the economy
is at the threshold, then it should at least not be refrained, from a wel-
fare point of view, from passing the threshold. This condition identified by
Tahvonen and Withagen (1996) requires the marginal utility of the first unit
of consumption U ′(0) to be larger than total discounted marginal damages:
D′(z¯)/δ. To see this, focus now on the problem with irreversibility of decay.
If an economy with abundant resource were to exceed the threshold in finite
time, it would achieve in the long run a steady state with the extraction
rate y(= e) = 0 and a level of pollution given by U ′(0) = D′(z12∞)/δ. If
U ′(0) ≤ D′(z¯)/δ then we obtain a contradiction because z12∞ ≤ z¯. So, it must
hold that U ′(0) > D′(z¯)/δ. If we further require U ′(s) > D′(z¯)/δ, then the
previous condition is satisfied because U ′(s) < U ′(0) and it is also possible
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to have the combination 11 - 12 - 22 that is, to adopt the backstop after the
situation as turned irreversible. Indeed the steady state of regime 22 is feasi-
ble. This case makes sense because adopting the backstop once the solution
has turned irreversible allows the economy to keep pollution damage under
control.
Regarding reversible solutions (given by the timing 11 21), a first nec-
essary existence condition is c < U ′(0). Suppose that c = U ′(0), then the
marginal benefit from adopting the backstop is always less than the marginal
cost, which precludes the occurrence of a technological switch. In the same
spirit one has to impose c < U ′(y11∞), which is stronger than the first con-
dition. Suppose the economy starts in regime 11 from z0 < z
11
∞ and that
this regime is permanent. There is no opportunity to switch either tech-
nically or ecologically. Then the optimal policy consists in choosing initial
consumption y(0) so that the system converges to the saddle point along
the stable branch. Now assume that c = U ′(y11∞). Given that the optimal
consumption path is monotonically decreasing and U ′(y) is decreasing in y,
this implies that U ′(y11(t)) < c for all t < ∞. So, we can claim that the
adoption of the backstop in finite time is implausible. This condition con-
veys the idea that the unit cost of the non polluting technology should be
low enough to make the reversible policies attractive. The third necessary
condition involves both the unit cost of the backstop and the level of energy
it supplies, s: c < U ′(y21∞). It generalizes the preceding one and also states
that, given s, the adoption of the backstop is worthwhile for low c. A quick
look at the phase diagram depicted in figure 3 confirms that the trajectory
that originates in regime 11 and converges to (y21∞, z
21
∞) necessarily ends with
a period during which consumption decreases whereas pollution increases.
This in turn implies that the consumption level U ′−1(c) that triggers the
technological switch must be higher than the long run value y21∞.
Figure 3 gives an illustration of the shape of reversible and irreversible
policies in the (z, y) plan. It depicts a reversible policy (green) when the tech-
nological switch occurs at a pollution level z21(ts) below z21∞ (with t
z = ∞).
It should be clear that energy consumption satisfies yi1(ts) > y21∞: Once the
switch has occurred, pollution monotonically increases and consumption of
fossil fuels decreases till the convergence to the steady state. The other tra-
jectory represents the evolution of both y and z when the threshold is hit
in finite time (with ts = ∞). Along an irreversible path (purple), consump-
tion of fossil fuels is monotonically decreasing except at the instant of the
switch when y, and therefore e, jumps upward whereas the pollution stock is
monotonically increasing till the convergence toward z12∞ .
25
zy
s
z¯
z˙21 = 0
y˙i1 = 0
z˙22 = 0
y˙i2 = 0
z˙11 = 0
z˙12 = 0
0 z0
U ′−1(c)
y12(tz)
z21∞ z
11
∞
Figure 3: Reversible vs. irreversible solutions.
Under the set of conditions discussed above, our general problem with
an abundant resource may feature multiple optimality candidates: Both a
reversible and an irreversible policy, originating from the same initial condi-
tion z0, can satisfy the necessary optimality conditions. It proves however
difficult to investigate more deeply the conditions under which the two kinds
of trajectories depicted in figure 3 exist. The issue of multiplicity in turn
raises the question of the nature of the optimal solution. It is clear that to
answer this question we have no option but to compute the present value
associated with each candidate and determine which one yields the highest
value. There is of course little chance to conduct this analysis analytically.
That is why, in the next section, we will proceed by means of a calibration
of our model. The numerical analysis will allow us not only to address the
issues of multiplicity and optimality but also to compare our results with
those of Prieur et al. (2011), who analyze a similar problem but do not
consider the possible adoption of a backstop technology. Since they have a
non-renewable resource in their study, from now on, we will work in the more
general framework where the economy is submitted to the resource constraint
(13).
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4.2 The case of a scarce resource
The numerical analysis is conducted using the same functional forms and
parameters values as Prieur et al. (2011). They use a linear quadratic model{
U(y) = θy(2y¯ − y), θ > 0
D(z) = γz
2
2
, γ > 0
, (22)
and rely on a calibration exercise developed by Karp and Zhang (2012) to
fix the following set of baseline parameters:9
δ = 0.05, α = 0.0083, γ = 0.0022, θ = 26.992, y¯ = 16.206, z0 = 781 and z¯ = 1200.
(23)
The initial stock of exhaustible resource x0 is not set to a particular value
because there is a substantial uncertainty surrounding the exact level of avail-
able fossil fuels in the ground. In what follows, the variable will be critical
in determining the number of optimality candidates and the nature of the
optimal solution.
Regarding the parameters that are specific to the backstop technology,
we consider in our benchmark that the non polluting technology supplies
20% of the maximum level of energy consumption, s = 0.2y¯, and we assume
c = 300. These assumptions allow for a phase of simultaneous use of the two
sources of energy (before exhaustion) because they satisfy U ′(s) 6= c.
Table (1) presents the existence results in the benchmark case.10 As-
suming that the economy initially does not use the backstop technology, our
problem can a priori exhibits nine optimality candidates corresponding to all
the possible combinations of regimes. The first, second and sixth columns
are the optimality candidates identified in Prieur et al. (2011), who do not
deal with the backstop technology. They show that for a low enough initial
9Here we refer the reader to Prieur et al. (2011) for a justification of the choice of the
parameter values. Simply notice that in their study U(y) represents the utility or benefit
from emissions. In our framework, this function is defined in terms of energy consumption.
In particular, y¯ represents the maximum level of energy consumption whereas in their
model, it yields the maximum level of CO2 emissions. This obviously means that we have
to be careful with the calibration of U(y). In the simple numerical exercise to follow, we
however decided to keep the same values as in the scenario where the authors allow for
the highest y¯, at least for the sake of comparison.
10Tables and figures are relegated in the appendix. The values reported in row are the
x0 critical for the existence of the optimality candidates (in column). The inequality “≤”
means that the critical x0 is an upper bound whereas “≥” and “>” refer to a lower bound
for existence. A cell with a “no” indicates that the corresponding optimality candidate
doesn’t exist. All the figures depict the present values, for particular solutions, as functions
of x0.
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resource stock (x0 ≤ 1211, 5), the unique solution is reversible (regime 11 is
permanent) and thus yields the optimum. For larger x0(≥ 2141.1), they ob-
tain two kinds of optimality candidates, one is reversible (with the pollution
stock staying at the threshold for a while) and the others are irreversible.11
The optimum remains the reversible solution up to a critical x0 ≈ 2400 from
which the optimal solution becomes irreversible. In the remainder of the
section, we investigate how the opportunity to adopt a backstop technology
affects their conclusions.
For low enough x0(≤ 1145.5), there exist two optimality candidates, both
are fully reversible, i.e., are such that z(t) ≤ z¯ for all t (where the equality
can hold for no more than one instant of time). Fully reversible policies with
adoption exist for a smaller interval of values of the initial resource stock
x0 than their counterpart without adoption. In addition, they always yield
lower present values than fully reversible policies with no adoption (see figure
5, left). For higher x0(> 1211.5), the unique reversible policy does not entail
a switch to the backstop technology and exhibits a stage at the threshold. So,
we don’t have an optimality candidate featuring both adoption and a period
of time spent at the threshold (these situations correspond to timings 11 z¯
11 21 and 11 21 z¯ 21). The reason why adopting the backstop technology
before staying for a while at the threshold is not optimal is the following.
For the adoption of the backstop to be optimal, the economy has to incur
a substantial reduction of its consumption of fossil fuels to a level e˜ such
that U ′(e˜ + s) = c. For our parameters, this level is lower than the level of
extraction compatible with the pollution stock staying at z¯ for a period of
time: e˜ < αz¯. Along candidate 11 21 z¯ 21, the adoption of the backstop
should then be followed by a phase during which extraction increases. But
this is not optimal. If the economy were to adopt the backstop, then it would
not increase its rate of extraction immediately after it has paid c to reduce
it. Regarding the timing 11 z¯ 11 21, it appears that the level of extraction
that triggers adoption, eˆ such that U ′(eˆ) = c, is now higher than αz¯, the
11When the initial stock of resource is large, it is necessary that the economy stays at
the threshold for a non degenerated period of time for a reversible solution to exist. In
other words, the pure state constraint z ≤ z¯ is binding for a period of time. They also have
an irreversible candidate for which the economy spends a period of time at the threshold
before entering the irreversible region. But, the authors have shown that this kind of
candidate is always dominated by the path along which the economy directly enters the
irreversible region upon arrival to the threshold (this corresponds to 11 12). Therefore
this candidate is irrelevant for the optimality analysis and we won’t consider it in the
subsequent analysis. Finally, we don’t pay attention to irreversible policies that do not
exhaust the resource since it has been observed by Prieur et al. (2011) that they exist only
for very large and not relevant values of the initial endowment in exhaustible resources,
which is also the case here.
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extraction level which prevails during the phase at the threshold. Thus,
this path would require extraction to follow a U-shape pattern, which is not
optimal either.
As for irreversible solutions, the opportunity to adopt the backstop makes
irreversible policies more likely. In other words, solutions with timing 11 12
22 exist for lower x0 than irreversible candidates without adoption, given
by the timing 11 12 (2094.1 vs. 2141.1). For x0 ≥ 2141.1, we have three
optimality candidates: a reversible solution, corresponding to timing 11 z¯ 11,
and two irreversible, with and without adoption. We never obtain irreversible
solutions along which the backstop is adopted before the irreversible region
is entered (this would coincide with timing 11 21 22). By contrast with what
has been observed for reversible policies, irreversible candidates with the
adoption of the backstop in finite time outperform the ones without adoption
(see figure 4) for intermediate values of x0 (the present values converge to the
same level for high enough x0). Figure 4 also reveals that the optimal policy
turns irreversible for a lower value of x0 than the one obtained by Prieur et al.
(2011), this critical level being given by the intersection between the curves
representing the present values of, on one hand, the reversible candidate, and
on the other, the irreversible solution with adoption of the backstop.
Hence, two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the benchmark.
First, reversible policies that involve a switch to the backstop technology
exist for a smaller range of values of x0 than – and are always dominated by
– the reversible policies with no adoption. So, it does not pay to adopt the
backstop technology in a reversible world, that is, in a world where the initial
stock of the polluting and exhaustible resource is so low that it is physically
impossible to cross the threshold in finite time. Second, our analysis stresses
that the opportunity to adopt a backstop translates into the existence of
irreversible policies for a larger range of values of the initial resource stock.
Upon reflexion, this conclusion seems quite natural because adopting the
backstop after the crossing of the irreversibility threshold is a means to keep
environmental damages, due to the ever increasing pollution stock, under
control. So, it makes irreversible policies more worthwhile. Regarding the
welfare comparison, the previous argument also explains why irreversible
policies with a backstop yield a higher present value than irreversible policies
without adoption and become optimal for a lower level of the initial stock of
resource.
Let us now see whether these findings are robust to a change in the unit
cost of the backstop and in the level of energy consumption brought by the
backstop. The results of the sensitivity analysis are summarized in table 2.
Consider a low unit cost: c = 100. In this case, our first conclusion does
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not hold anymore. Fully reversible policies, with backstop adoption in finite
time, exist for larger x0 than the ones for which reversible policies with no
technological switch exist. We also observe that the ranking between fully
reversible policies is reversed (see figure 5, left). This means that the cost of
the backstop should be low enough for the optimal policy to entail a switch
to the non polluting technology. Another difference with the benchmark
scenario is that reversible policy with adoption exists for any x0 > 0. Indeed,
for large enough x0(> 1294.1), the economy will stay at threshold for a non
degenerate period of time (which corresponds to the timing 11 z¯ 11 21).12
We can however note that for x0 > 1211.5, reversible policies with a stage
at the threshold yield higher values when they are not accompanied by the
adoption of the backstop at some point in time (figure 6, left).
Our second conclusion regarding irreversible candidates is reinforced. For
this low c, we can observe that irreversible candidates with adoption exist for
lower levels of the initial stock of resource than in the benchmark. We can
still conclude that as far as irreversible policies are concerned, adopting the
backstop is always better than sticking to the carbon economy (see figure 5,
right). Furthermore, it turns out that once this irreversible candidate exists,
it yields the optimal solution.13 Thus by contrast with the benchmark case
and with Prieur et al. (2011)’s findings, reversible policies with a stage at
the threshold are always dominated by irreversible policies with adoption
(see figure 6, right). This also means that the optimum is irreversible for a
much lower level of the initial stock of fossil fuels, x0 ≈ 1815.8 GtC, than for
a high c.
Things work differently when we set the unit cost to the highest possible
one: c = 699.9. This level is defined by the following equality: U ′(s) = c and
therefore corresponds to the limit case where adoption occurs at the instant
when the resource is exhausted and extraction ceases. In this scenario the
first conclusion drawn from the benchmark is valid but the second one is
not because for a given x0, the irreversible policy with adoption yields a
lower present value than the irreversible policy without (figure 5, right). The
previous logic discussed above now is cancelled by the fact that the backstop
is too costly. Therefore, whatever the ecological regime, it is never optimal
to switch to the backstop technology and the conclusion is qualitatively the
same as in Prieur et al. (2011) i.e. irreversible solutions with adoption don’t
matter in the analysis of the optimum.
12This combination of regimes is possible here since it does not involve a phase during
which the extraction rate increases: αz¯ > e˜.
13In the range [1114.7, 1210.8], there exists a last irreversible candidate with timing 11
22: The economy adopts the backstop at the instant when the threshold is exceeded. But,
this solution is always dominated in terms of welfare.
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In sum, the sensitivity analysis reveals that varying c has the following
impact on the existence and ordering between optimality candidates: The
lower c the higher (resp. lower) the critical bound x0 for the existence of
fully reversible (resp. irreversible) policies with adoption. In addition, for
low enough or high enough c there exist reversible policies with adoption
whatever x0 while for intermediate value of c, x0 must be small enough.
The last variation around the benchmark consists in increasing the level
of the backstop to s = 0.4y¯. As can be seen from table 2 and figure 5, left
and right, conclusions remain qualitatively the same as in the benchmark
scenario. We however observe that a higher s makes irreversible candidates
with adoption optimal for lower x0 than in the benchmark. Hence the impact
of an increase in s on the occurrence and optimality of irreversible solutions
is similar to the one of a decrease in c.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined a quite general optimal control problem
involving two types of regime switch, which in our view represent a large
part of regime switch problems occurring in economics. In particular, our
setting includes most of the technological and/or institutional regime switch
problems considered in the economic literature. Typically, these regimes are
indexed by a finite number of discrete parameter values. We also incorporate
another type of regime switch problems borrowed from the environmental
economics literature where regimes rely on given threshold values for given
state variables consistently with the irreversible pollution specification. We
have proposed a general optimal control framework allowing to derive the
first-order optimality conditions and in particular to characterize the geom-
etry of the shadow prices at optimal switching times (if any). We have also
applied our methodology to solve the problem of the optimal management
of natural resources under ecological irreversibility, and with the possibility
to switch to a backstop technology.
While the methodology presented cannot be fully analytical (because the
inherent problem necessarily displays multiple potential optimal solutions)
and should be complemented with an adequate numerical assessment, we
do believe that it paves the way to handle a much wider class of problems,
beyond environmental economics. Indeed, it is easy to figure out other control
problems involving technological-like switches under threshold effects: for
example, technology adoptions problems should be ideally treated together
with a human capital accumulation engine, the former being potentially sub-
optimal if the stock of human capital is below a threshold value. We can
31
think of many more applications in other areas like economy demography
and unified growth theory where the notion of minimal population size for
economic take-off is invoked (see for example, Galor, 2005).
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
This appendix is devoted to give the proof of Theorem 1, the main theorem
of the paper. The proof use standard calculus of variations techniques in a
sequence of three control sub-problems as explained in the main text.
Third interval sub-problem: The corresponding control sub-problem is:
max
{u}
V3 =
∞∫
t2
[F (u, x1, x2)] e
−δtdt (24)
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
22
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
22
2 (u, x1, x2)
where t2 and the initial conditions x1(t2) and x2(t2) are fixed. x1(t2) will
be made free in the next stages while x2(t2) is fixed by construction, equal
to x¯2. Problem (24) is standard and can be solved trivially using the usual
Pontrygin method. We don’t develop the method for this trivial problem. In
particular, and to fix the notation, one would rely on the hamiltonian of the
problem, H3, given by
H3 = F e
−δt + λ221 G
22
1 + λ
22
2 G
22
2 .
Problem (24) yields straightforward first-order necessary conditions (includ-
ing the appropriate transversality conditions which ultimately depend on the
shape of function F and Gijk , i, j, k = 1, 2, and possible sign constraint on
state variables). Let’s denote by upperscript ∗ the paths identified by these
conditions. A crucial property of the corresponding value function is that it
does not depend on x2(t2) as a free variable since the latter is fixed
equal to x¯2. Henceforth, the value-function V
∗
3 is only a function of t2 and
x1(t2). Denote x
1
2 the latter, one can write: V
∗
3 (t2, x
1
2). Moreover, one also
have trivially the following envelope conditions under Hypothesis (2.2):
∂V ∗3
∂t2
= −H∗3 (t2), (25)
and
∂V ∗3
∂x12
= λ22∗1 (t2). (26)
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Second interval sub-problem: The corresponding control sub-problem is:
max
{u,t2,x12}
V2 =
t2∫
t1
[F (u, x1, x2)] e
−δtdt+ V ∗3 (t2, x
1
2) (27)
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
21
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
21
2 (u, x1, x2)
,
where t1, x1(t1) = x
1
1 and x2(t1) = x
2
1 are given, and t2 and x1(t2) = x
1
2
are free. This problem is much less trivial than the previous one. We shall
develop the calculus of variations method required to extract all the first-
order conditions. Denote by H2 the corresponding hamiltonian, that is:
H2 = F e
−δt + λ211 G
21
1 + λ
21
2 G
21
2 .
One can readily write the value-function in terms of the hamiltonian:
V2 =
t2∫
t1
[
H2 − λ211 x˙1 − λ212 x˙2
]
dt+ V ∗3 (t2, x
1
2).
Standard integrations by parts yield for k = 1, 2:
t2∫
t1
λ21k x˙k dt = λ
21
k (t2)xk(t2)− λ21k (t1)xk(t1)−
t2∫
t1
λ˙21k xk dt,
which allows to rewrite V2 as:
V2 =
t2∫
t1
[
H2 + λ˙
21
1 x1 + λ˙
21
2 x2
]
dt+ V ∗3 (t2, x
1
2)− λ211 (t2)x1(t2) + λ211 (t1)x1(t1)
−λ212 (t2)x2(t2) + λ212 (t1)x2(t1)
First-order variation of V2 with respect to the state and control variables’
paths, for fixed t1, x1(t1) = x
1
1 and x2(t1) = x
2
1 but free t2 and x
1
2, yields:
∂V2 =
t2∫
t1
[
∂H2
∂x1
∂x1 +
∂H2
∂x2
∂x2 +
∂H2
∂u
∂u+ λ˙211 ∂x1 + λ˙
21
2 ∂x2
]
dt
+
(
H2(t2) + λ˙
21
1 (t2) x
1
2 + λ˙
21
2 (t2) x¯2
)
∂t2
+
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂t2
∂t2 +
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂x12
∂x12 − λ˙211 (t2)x12 ∂t2 − λ211 (t2) ∂x12 − λ˙212 (t2)x¯2 ∂t2.
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Rearranging terms, one gets:
∂V2 =
t2∫
t1
[(
∂H2
∂x1
+ λ˙211
)
∂x1 +
(
∂H2
∂x2
+ λ˙212
)
∂x2 +
∂H2
∂u
∂u
]
dt
+
(
H2(t2) +
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂t2
)
∂t2 +
(
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂x12
− λ211 (t2)
)
∂x12.
A trajectory is (locally) optimal if any (local) departure from it decreases
the value function, that is ∂V2 ≤ 0 for any ∂x1(t) and ∂x2(t), t ∈ (t1 t2),
for any ∂u(t), t ∈ [t1 t2], and for any ∂t2 and ∂x12, which gives the following
necessary conditions for an interior maximizer:
∂H2
∂u
= 0
∂H2
∂x1
+ λ˙211 = 0
∂H2
∂x2
+ λ˙212 = 0
H2(t2) +
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂t2
= 0
∂V ∗3 (t2,x
1
2)
∂x12
− λ211 (t2) = 0
(28)
The first three equations are the standard Pontryagin conditions, the last
two may be interpreted as optimality conditions with respect to the switch-
ing time, t2, and the free state value, x
1
2. Together with conditions (25)-(26)
obtained from the first sub-problem, one gets the first two optimality condi-
tions of Theorem (3.1), that is:
H∗2 (t2) = H
∗
3 (t2),
and
λ21∗1 (t2) = λ
22∗
1 (t2).
Notice finally that by construction of the second sub-problem, its value
function V2 depends on the fixed initial conditions and t1, we thus write it
V ∗2 (t1, x
1
1, x
2
1). Again one can write the following envelope properties thanks
to Hypothesis (2.2):
∂V ∗2
∂t1
= −H∗2 (t1), (29)
∂V ∗2
∂x11
= λ21∗1 (t1), (30)
and
∂V ∗2
∂x21
= λ21∗2 (t1), (31)
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First interval sub-problem: The corresponding control sub-problem is:
max
{u,t1,x11,x21}
V1 = V =
t1∫
0
[F (u, x1, x2)] e
−δtdt+ V ∗2 (t1, x
1
1, x
2
1) (32)
subject to, {
x˙1 = G
11
1 (u, x1, x2)
x˙2 = G
11
2 (u, x1, x2)
,
with x1(0) and x2(0) given, and with free t1, x
1
1, and x
2
1. Again the prob-
lem is not trivial. One may use the same technique of calculus of variations
seen above for the second sub-problem. Indeed, denoting H1 the hamiltonian
of the the sub-problem, given by:
H1 = F e
−δt + λ111 G
11
1 + λ
11
2 G
11
2 ,
one can replicate the same steps just above, and obtain the following first
variation of the value function ∂V1:
∂V1 =
t1∫
0
[(
∂H1
∂x1
+ λ˙111
)
∂x1 +
(
∂H1
∂x2
+ λ˙112
)
∂x2 +
∂H1
∂u
δu
]
dt+
(
H1(t1) +
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂t1
)
∂t1
+
(
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂x11
− λ111 (t1)
)
∂x11 +
(
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂x21
− λ112 (t1)
)
∂x21
Again, for ∂V1 ≤ 0 for any (local) variations of the free variables, on
should impose the following first-order necessary conditions (for a local max-
imizer): 
∂H1
∂u
= 0
∂H1
∂x1
+ λ˙111 = 0
∂H1
∂x2
+ λ˙112 = 0
H1(t1) +
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂t1
= 0
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂x11
− λ111 (t1) = 0
∂V ∗2 (t2,x
1
1,x
2
1)
∂x21
− λ112 (t1) = 0
(33)
The three last conditions could be interpreted as optimality conditions
with respect to t1, x
1
1 and x
2
1 respectively. Coupled with the envelope con-
ditions (29) to (31), one gets the last three matching conditions stated in
Theorem (3.1):
H∗1 (t1) = H
∗
2 (t1),
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λ11∗1 (t1) = λ
21∗
1 (t1),
and
λ11∗2 (t1) = λ
21∗
2 (t1),
which ends the proof of the theorem. 2
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B Numerical example
Figure 4: Benchmark: Multiplicity and optimality.
Table 1: Benchmark s = 0.2y¯, c = 300
11 11 z¯ 11 11 21 11 21 z¯ 21 11 z¯ 11 21 11 12 11 12 22 11 21 22 11 22
x0 ≤ 1211,5 >1211,5 ≤1145.5 no no ≥2141.1 ≥2094.1 no no
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Figure 5: Reversible policies (left). Irreversible policies (right)
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis
11 21 11 21 z¯ 21 11 z¯ 11 21 11 12 22 11 21 22 11 22
c = 699.9: x0 ≤1203.6 no >1203.6 ≥2132 no no
c = 100: x0 ≤1294.1 no >1294.1 ≥1815.8 no [1114.7, 1210.8]
s = 0.4y¯: x0 ≤1172.9 no no ≥1995.5 no [1095.9, 1102.4]
Figure 6: Comparison between present values
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